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INTRODUCTION

On October 22, 1983, Alice Langford, who was then eight-and-a-half
months pregnant, was involved in a tragic automobile accident in which she
lost her unborn baby.1 Subsequently, Mrs. Langford and her husband sued
the driver who had negligently caused this accident.2 At the trial, the
Langfords showed that the unborn child, Robert, was a fully developed and
viable fetus at the time of the accident.3 Summary judgment was granted
against the Langfords, denying them any recovery for the loss of their child.4
The court of appeals reversed the part of the trial court's decision disallow1. Langford v. Blackman, 790 S.W.2d 127, 127 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 795
S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990).
2. See id. (outlining basic facts of case).
3. See id. at 130 (appellate court holding that child was viable).
4. See id. at 127 (summary judgment granted for defendant).
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ing recovery for Robert's death.' This reversal was based on the fact that
the fetus was viable and therefore "a person and an individual human being"
for purposes of the Texas wrongful death and survival statutes.6
However, on September 19, 1990, in a thirty-two line per curiam opinion,
the Texas Supreme Court denied Mrs. Langford any recovery whatsoever
for the loss of her baby.7 In reversing the lower court's decision, the court
held that Texas does not recognize a wrongful death cause of action for a
viable fetus which is later stillborn.' This holding was based on two previous
cases in which similar recovery was denied. 9 These decisions expressly held
that because the fetus was unborn, it was not an "individual" for purposes of
the wrongful death statute.10
Actions for wrongful death are just one area in which Texas courts have
passed judgment on the rights and protections of unborn children. 1 Other
areas include property law, family law, criminal law, constitutional law, and
tort law. Many areas of Texas law have been affected by rapid changes relating to fetal rights.' 2 Yet rights of unborn children vary greatly depending
upon which area of Texas law controls the action involving the fetus. 3 One
area of law may protect fetal rights from the point of birth,"4 while another

5. Langford, 790 S.W.2d at 130.
6. Id. The court reasoned that previous cases denying wrongful death actions for fetuses
had not addressed the issue of viability. Id. at 128.
7. See Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742, 743 (rex. 1990) (reversing appellate
court's decision granting the Langfords recovery in wrongful death).
8. Id.
9. See id. (citing Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex.
1987) and Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d 23, 23 (rex. 1987)).
10. See Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987)
(holding that no cause of action exists for fetal death); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist.v. Lobdell,
726 S.W.2d 23, 23 (Tex. 1987) (holding that no cause of action exists for wrongful death of
fetus).
11. See, eg., Langford, 790 S.W.2d at 130 (court finding violation of constitutional rights
in failing to recognize viable fetus as person under wrongful death statute); Aguilar v. Barker,
699 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (family law case granting
retroactive child support from time of birth); Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689, 693-94 (Tex.
App.-EI Paso 1985, writ ref'd) (criminal case finding that viable fetus unsuccessfully aborted
and then suffocated is individual under Texas' murder statute); James v. James, 164 S.W. 47,
47 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1914, writ dism'd) (probate case allowing unborn child to
take under will).
12. See Leal v. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. 1967) (noting rapid
changes in law relating to recovery for injuries to viable infants).
13. CompareYandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (allowing recovery for
negligence causing injuries to unborn child) with Blackman, 795 S.W.2d at 743 (disallowing
recovery for negligence causing death of unborn child).
14. See, eg., Blackman, 795 S.W.2d at 743 (no recovery for wrongful death without live
birth); Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692 (murder statute applies from point of live birth); Adams v.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss1/8

2

Gately: Texas Fetal Rights: Is There a Future for the Rights of Future Te

COMMENTS

1991]

gives rights from the point of conception, 5 while yet another confers rights
on the fetus from the point of viability. 6 This comment seeks to point out
the inconsistencies which have resulted from varied views of the rights of
unborn children and analyzes the need for a synthesized view of fetal rights
in Texas.

II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF FETAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS
In order to understand the inconsistencies present in the various approaches to fetal rights under Texas law, it is important to first examine the
background of fetal rights in several areas of Texas law. Some areas have
adopted common law views of fetal rights' 7 while others have created or
denied fetal rights statutorily." Some areas have even been influenced by
medical science.' 9
A.

Fetal PropertyRights

The right of a fetus to inherit property was first recognized in Texas as
early as 1914.30 However, decisions allowing an unborn child to inherit are
rooted in the common law and date back much further.2 ' This right of inStotts, 667 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (holding Family Code legitimates child from birth for purposes of child support payments).
15. See James, 164 S.W. at 47 (allowing unborn child to recover under will); Nelson v.
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 626, 14 S.W. 1021, 1023 (1890) (allowing recovery
in wrongful death action by child conceived but unborn at time of father's death).
16. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991)
(with exceptions, no one may knowingly or intentionally perform abortion on woman pregnant
with viable fetus in third trimester); TEX. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976)
(penalty for destroying child which would otherwise have been born alive is five years to life);
Brady v. Doe, 598 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (woman and her doctor have decision on abortion during first trimester based on Roe v.
Wade decision), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1081 (1981).
17. See Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 624-25, 14 S.W. 1021,
1022-23 (1890) (relying on English common law to find that child conceived but unborn at
time of father's death could recover for wrongful death).
18. See, e.g., TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 13.06 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing for payment of prenatal health care expenses of child in paternity suit); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 34A (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing for representation of unborn persons in probate proceedings); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.014(a) (Vernon 1984) (providing for representation
of unborn persons in suits involving trusts).
19. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.01 1(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991) ("viable" defined based on physician's judgment). But see Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1987) (although scientific advancements have been made,
legislature creates rights of action).
20. James v. James, 164 S.W. 47, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, writ dism'd).
21. See Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 624-25, 14 S.W. 1021,
1022-23 (1890) (citing common law decisions allowing unborn child to inherit as early as
1798).
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heritance is recognized from the time of conception.22 Further, the rule
against perpetuities 23 provides for a period of gestation, thus allowing an
extra period from conception to birth for a property interest to vest before
the rule would be violated.' Although a fetus may inherit property under
Texas law, the fetus is not itself property and therefore parents cannot recover property damages for the destruction of their fetus.25
Certain portions of the Texas Probate and Trust Codes even make provisions for unborn children in suits which would affect their property rights.26
These statutes provide for representation of the unborn child by others.27
The Trust Code also provides a method for notice to be given to the unborn
child,28 and both the Trust and Probate Codes provide a method for disclaiming property interests on behalf of the child.29
B. Family Law Affecting the Fetus
Family law is another area which affects the rights of the unborn.
Although the Texas Family Code does not identify exactly when a fetus
22. See James, 164 S.W. at 47 (recognizing children en ventre sa mere as persons in being
who may inherit under a will). En ventre sa mere is defined as: "In its mother's womb. A
term descriptive of an unborn child. For some purposes the law regards an infant en ventre as
in being. It may take a legacy; have a guardian; an estate may be limited to its use, etc."
BLACK'S LAW DIcnroNAY 534 (6th ed. 1990).
23. The rule against perpetuities renders void any attempt to create an interest which
does not vest within twenty-one years of a life in being at the time of the grant plus a period for
gestation. Foshee v. Republic Natl Bank of Dallas, 617 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1981). This is
based on a Texas constitutional prohibition of perpetuities. TEx. CONST. art I, § 26.
24. See, eg., Foshee, 617 S.W.2d at 677 (Tex. 1981) (citing rule against perpetuities with
period of gestation language); Henderson v. Moore, 144 Tex. 398, 401, 190 S.W.2d 800, 801
(1946) (stating rule as twenty-one years with period of gestation if necessary; then stating that
when lives in being form no part of grant, period is merely twenty-one years).
25. Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987) (no cause
of action for destruction of chattel where fetus destroyed).
26. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing method for representative to disclaim interest of unborn beneficiary taking under a will); TEx. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 115.013(d) (Vernon 1984) (notice requirements for unborn persons in suit involving
trust).
27. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 34A (Vernon Supp. 1991) (probate judge may appoint
guardian and/or attorney ad litem to represent unborn persons in probate cases); Tax. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 115.014(a) (Vernon 1984) (providing for appointment of guardian ad litem for
unborn persons in suits involving trusts).
28. See Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.013(d) (Vernon 1984) (providing for notice to
unrepresented unborn beneficiaries in suit involving a trust by giving notice to those with similar interests in the trust).
29. See TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp. 1991) (provision for method of
disclaiming interest under a will by representative of unborn person); Tax. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 112.010(cX2) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (allowing representative of unborn person to disclaim
interest in trust with court approval).
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gains rights, it does make several provisions for the unborn.30 Under the
Texas Family Code, a mother has no right to receive child support until the
child is actually born.3 1 However, she does have the right to recover expenses for prenatal care of the child from the father. 2 In addition, the Famfly Code allows a suit for the termination of the parent-child relationship to
be filed before the child is born.33 The code also provides for termination of
the parent-child relationship in a situation where an attempted abortion
proves unsuccessful and the child survives."'
C. Fetal Protections Through CriminalSanctions
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,35 un36
born children were strictly protected by Texas' criminal abortion statutes.
However, in Roe, the Court determined that these statutes were an unconstitutional violation of a woman's right to privacy. 37 Subsequently, the Texas
Penal Code has been stripped of all criminal abortion laws.38
Likewise, other criminal statutes do not provide any protection for the
unborn child from criminal acts.39 The definition of an "individual" in the
Texas Penal Code is limited to "a human being who has been born and is
alive."' Thus, Texas' homicide statutes have been interpreted to exclude an
unborn fetus from their protection.41 Only if the fetus is born alive does it
30. See Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.42(a), 15.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991), § 15.022(a)
(Vernon 1986) (prenatal health care expenses recoverable retroactively).
31. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (alleged father not required to make child support payment until paternity is established); see also Aguilar v.
Barker, 699 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1985, no writ) (family law case
granting retroactive child support from time of birth); Adams v. Stotts, 667 S.W.2d 798, 800
(Tex.App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (parental responsibilities begin at birth of child).
32. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.06(f) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (submission of medical
bill copy is prima facie evidence of prenatal expenses for recovery from father); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 13.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (providing for retroactive payment of prenatal
expenses on finding of paternity).
33. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
34. See id. § 15.022(a) (Vernon 1986) (termination petition may be granted if abortion
resulted in live birth of child).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See id. at 117-18 n.1 (listing arts. 1191-1194, and art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code
which prohibited abortion except to save the mother's life).
37. See id. at 166 (holding Texas criminal abortion laws unconstitutional).
38. See TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4512.1-4512.4, 4512.6 (Vernon 1976) (former
Penal Code provisions which outlawed abortion held unconstitutional).
39. See, e.g., Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ
ref'd) (murder statute required child be alive as defined by traditional concepts); Ogas v. State,
655 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ) (unborn fetus not a "person" under
defense of third person statute).
40. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17) (Vernon 1974).

41. See Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692 (murder statute does not apply to nonviable fetus).
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gain a protected status under the murder statute. 2 This does mean, however, that if a fetus survives an abortion, its destruction is considered murder.4 3 Furthermore, a fetus is not considered a "person" for purposes of
defense of a third party.' Decisions excluding the unborn from the protections of third-party defense statutes are based on statutory interpretations
requiring a live birth before one becomes a "person." 4'
D.

ConstitutionalLaw: FetalRights and Abortion

As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
sounded the death knell for Texas' abortion statutes." Roe proscribed state
laws prohibiting abortion prior to viability of the fetus.47 This decision was
based on a balancing of the mother's right to privacy and the state's interest
in the protection of potential life.48 The Court reasoned that a state's interest in potential life did not become compelling until the point of viability,
and therefore, laws prohibiting abortion prior to viability were an unconstitutional incursion into a woman's right to privacy.4 9
In response to this Supreme Court mandate declaring the Texas abortion
laws unconstitutional, the legislature replaced the abortion statutes with a
new one conforming to the restrictions of Roe.5 ° Currently, the Texas abortion law makes abortions legal in all cases up to the point of viability of the
fetus."' Beyond that point, abortion in Texas is still legal where the child
would be born with an abnormality or where the life of the mother is endan42. See id. (discussing Penal Code's definition of "individual" as one born alive).
43. See id. at 694 (upholding defendant's murder conviction based on jury finding of live
birth after unsuccessful abortion and taking of life by defendant after live birth).
44. See, e.g., Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
writ ref'd) (defense-of-third-party statute does not include unborn fetus), cerL denied, 490 U.S.
1066 (1989); Ogas, 655 S.W.2d at 325 (third-party-defense statute's definition of "person" does

not include unborn fetus).
45. See Ogas, 655 S.W.2d at 325 (statutory definition of person is a "human being who
has been born alive.").
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (declaring Texas abortion laws
unconstitutional).
47. See id. at 163-64 (state may protect fetal life by prohibiting abortion after point of
viability except when needed to preserve maternal health).
48. See id. at 154 (right to privacy must be considered in light of state regulatory

interests).

49. See id. at 163 (compelling point of state's interest is at viability).
50. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4512.1-.4, .6 (Vernon 1976) (declared unconstitutional); TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (current
abortion statute).
51. See TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (protecting viable fetus in third trimester); TEX.REV.Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976)
(protecting viable child through criminal sanctions).
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52
gered by the pregnancy.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Services5 3 has expanded the rights of a state to protect potential life.' The
Webster plurality opinion upheld a Missouri statute requiring viability tests
on fetuses twenty weeks old or more.5 5 The plurality opinion also allowed
the Missouri statute's preamble to stand which stated that "the life of each
human being begins at conception.",1 6 The Webster dissent argued that Roe
had been effectively overruled. 57 Texas has not taken any legislative action
in response to Webster.

E. Tort Law and the Fetus
The most rapidly changing area of the law concerning fetal rights is tort
law.5" Before 1967, Texas did not allow any recovery whatsoever for injuries
sustained by a child in utero.5 9 In contrast, Texas now allows actions based
on prenatal injuries to the fetus6" and wrongful birth.6 1
All Texas tort actions involving the unborn are predicated on the live
birth of the child.62 Thus, a fetus which is born alive and perishes within its
52. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.01 1(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (listing
exceptions for prevention of mother's death, prevention of serious physical and mental health
risks, and irreversible abnormalities of the fetus).
53. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
(recognizing
54. See id. at 519 (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and White, J.)
state interest in protecting unborn before point of viability).

55. Id. at 519-20.
56. Id. at 506-07. The Court refused to pass on the preamble's constitutionality. Id. at
507.
dissenting) (Roe would not pass muster
57. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 538 (Blackmun, J.,
under plurality's analysis).
58. See Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. 1967) (noting
overwhelming trend toward recovery for prenatal injuries in short time period). See generally
Rickhoff & Cukjati, Protecting the FetusFrom MaternalDrug andAlcohol Abuse: A Proposal
for Texas, 21 ST. MARY's L.J. 259, 277 (1989) (discussing dramatic change in fetal tort law
over past one hundred years); Comment, Unborn Child- Can You be Protected?,22 U. RICH.
L. REv. 285, 286-87 (1988) (discussing great changes in laws affecting fetuses).
59. See Leal,419 S.W.2d at 822 (overruling Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,
124 Tex. 347,78 S.W.2d 944 (1935)). Jordandenied recovery to parents of an unborn child in
wrongful death stating that no duty was owed to the child. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944, 950 (1935). See generally White, The Right of
Recovery for PrenatalInjuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 383, 397-99 (1952) (discussing the Jordancase).
60. See Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (allowing recovery for injuries occurring at any prenatal stage prefaced on live birth and survival of child).
61. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (court finding no public
policy for denying parents wrongful birth cause of action).
62. See Yandell, 471 S.W.2d at 570 (allowing recovery where "child is born alive and
survives"); Leal, 419 S.W.2d at 821 (holding where child born alive action for wrongful death

existed).
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first few days outside the womb constitutes a person and recovery is allowed
to the parents in a wrongful death action.6 3 Furthermore, a child born alive
may recover for the wrongful death of a parent which occurs while the child
is yet unborn." However, the live birth requirement negates any wrongful
death action by parents on behalf of a fetus which is not born alive. 65
III.

INCONSISTENCIES IN TEXAS LAW

This background demonstrates the confused nature of fetal rights in

Texas, and yet it is only the tip of the iceberg. Hence, most of the confusion
supporting these chilling inconsistencies lies deeper. The quandary understandably results from questions which have roots in philosophy, theology,
medical science, and the like.66 Courts are loath to answer such questions.67

A.

The Texas Fetus: Person, Nonperson or Property?

A fetus is not considered property according to the Texas case of Witty v.
American GeneralCapitalDistributor 6 1 Yet, under Witty, judicial interpretation of Texas' wrongful death and criminal statutes shows that a fetus is
not considered a person either.69 Therefore, if a Texas woman loses her
child due to the negligent act of another, she is allowed absolutely no recovery for that loss.70 However, under the Texas Uniform Commercial Code,
she has an enforceable property interest in any unborn livestock she owns.7 1
63. See Leal, 419 S.W.2d at 820-21 (allowing wrongful death action where child was born
alive, but died two days later).
64. See Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 626, 14 S.W. 1021, 1023
(Tex. 1890) (wrongful death recovery allowed because unborn child was "in being" at time of
father's death).
65. See Blackman v. Langford 795 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1990) (no wrongful death action for death of fetus until legislature says so); Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727
S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987) (no cause of action for fetal death); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v.
Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d 23, 23 (Tex. 1987) (wrongful death statute does not apply to death of a
fetus).
66. Cf Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (rex. 1987) (recognizing accomplishments in science, philosophy, and theology but denying their influence in
creating a cause of action).
67. See, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (declining to decide when life begins);
Vtty, 727 S.W.2d at 505 (declining to express opinion on fetal personhood based on philosophy or science).
68. 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987).
69. See id. (no fetal wrongful death cause of action under wrongful death statute).
70. See, eg., Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742, 743 (rex. 1990) (following prior
cases holding no cause of action exists under statute for wrongful death of fetus); Witty v.
American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1987) (holding that no wrongful
death action exists for life of fetus); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d 23, 23
(Tex. 1987) (following prior case disallowing fetal wrongful death action).
71. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (including
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Thus, according to judicial interpretation of these72Texas Statutes, unborn
cattle are of greater value than an unborn human.

Many times a fetus is considered a person under Texas law. 73 For instance, a fetus can inherit and hold property.7 4 Also, under the wrongful
death statute, the fetus is a person for purposes of recovering for the death of
a parent who died while the child was in utero.7 5 This determination was
based on an interpretation of legislative intent.76 This is not surprising since
even a fictional entity is considered a person under the Wrongful Death
Act. 77 However, under the same statute, Texas courts have found a fetus
not to be a person if the parents attempt to recover for the child's in utero
death.7" This finding was based on a lack of legislative intent to consider a

fetus a person. 79 Thus, the Supreme Court of Texas has decided that the

legislature intended a fetus to be both a person and a nonperson under a
single statute.8"
Comparison of cases allowing recovery for prenatal injuries with cases disallowing recovery for prenatal death also demonstrates the inconsistency in
Texas' approach to fetal rights. Texas allows recovery for prenatal injuries
contingent upon a live birth."1 However, it disallows recovery for prenatal
unborn animals in definition of "goods"); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.501(aX3) (iTex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968) (absent agreement, buyer obtains an insurable interest in unborn animal
at conception); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(aX8) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1991)
(definition of "goods" includes unborn animals).
72. Cf Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 506 (no evidence of legislative intent to protect fetus under
wrongful death statute).
73. Cf James v. James, 164 S.W. 47,47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, writ dism'd)
("in being" includes unborn child); Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 626,
14 S.W. 1021, 1023 (1890) (though unborn, fetus was "in being" at time of father's death).
74. See James, 164 S.W. at 47 (allowing unborn child to take under will).
75. See Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (allowing posthumous child recovery for
father's wrongful death); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61, 68-69, 12 S.W. 838,
840-41 (1889) (affirming wrongful death award to mother and children, one of which was
unborn at time of father's death). See generally White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal
Injuries, 12 LA. L. Rv. 383, 395-96 (1952) (discussing problems with arguments regarding an
unborn child as not in being).
76. See Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (concluding legislature intended to inlude unborn child in those having cause of action for father's wrongful death).
77. See Hugo, Schmeltzer & Co. v. Paiz, 104 Tex. 563, 567, 141 S.W. 518, 520 (1911)
(corporation is person under wrongful death statute).
78. See Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 504 (holding fetus not included as person or individual
under statute).
79. See id. at 506 (no legislative intent to include fetus in protection of wrongful death
statute).
80. Compare Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (child unborn at time of father's
death was "in being" under wrongful death statute) with Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 504 (unborn
child is not "person" under Wrongful Death Act).
81. See Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (rex. 1971) (action exists for injuries at
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injuries resulting in destruction of the fetus.8 2 This invokes the tragic results
of the old common law adage that "it is more profitable for a wrong-doer to
kill than to maim or injure."8 3
B.

When Does a Texan's Life Begin?

This is a question which the courts attempt to avoid." Even as judges are
making this determination, they disclaim that they are doing so." Yet they
are forced to impliedly answer the question every time they determine when
protection of fetal rights should begin.8 6 Texas lawmakers have implicitly
found life to7 begin at several points, thus leading to inconsistencies in fetal
protection.

At one extreme, life has been found to begin at conception. This is so for
purposes of inheritance, 8 appointment of a representative," the rule against
any prenatal stage contingent on live birth); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d
820, 821 ('rex. 1967) (wrongful death statute allows cause of action for infant born alive).
82. See Blackman, 795 S.W.2d at 743 (no cause of action for fetal death); titty, 727
S.W.2d at 506 (no wrongful death action for life of fetus); Lobdell, 726 S.W.2d at 23 (disallowing wrongful death action for unborn child); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124
Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944, 950 (1935) (no recovery allowed for death of unborn child).
83. Langford v. Blackman, 790 S.W.2d 127, 130 (rex. App.-Beaumont), revd, 795
S.W.2d 742 (rex. 1990). See generally Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Casmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REv.131, 147-151 (1979) (discussing arbitrariness of prohibiting tort
recovery for fetus not born alive).
84. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 800 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (describing question of when life begins as "unanswerable"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (judiciary not currently in position to resolve
question of when life begins); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 825, 832
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio) (question of when life begins is nonjusticiable), rev'd, 419
S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex. 1967). See generally Note, The Killing of a Viable Fetus isMurderKeeler v. Superior Court, 30 MD. L. Rav. 137, 137-38 (1970) (discussing historical legal views
of when life begins).
85. Compare Langford v. Blackman, 790 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tex. App.-Beaumont) (no
attempt to declare when life begins), rev'd, 795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990) with Langford, 790
S.W.2d at 132 (holding viable fetus to be a "person").
86. Cf, e.g., Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ
ref'd) (only human being born alive protected by murder statute); James v. James, 164 S.W.
47, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, writ dism'd) (children en ventre sa mere or, in the
mother's womb, are "in being"); Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex.621, 626, 14
S.W. 1021, 1023 (1890) (unborn fetus is "in being").
87. Compare Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (injuries sustained at
any prenatal stage recoverable contingent on live birth) with Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692 (live
birth is point where protection of murder statute accrues). See generally Gordon, The Unborn
Plaintiff, 63 MIh. L. Rav. 579, 586-88 (1965) (discussing inconsistencies of defining fetal
personhood in property and tort law).
88. See James, 164 S.W. at 47 (children in being includes those en ventre sa mere for
purpose of inheritance).
89. See Tax. PRoB.CODE ANN.§ 37A (Vernon Supp. 1991) (appointment of representa-
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perpetuities," and fetal recovery for the wrongful death of a parent.9 1 At
the other extreme, there are situations where life does not begin until birth.

Such is the case in criminal law, 92 most of tort law, 93 and family law.94 Be-

tween these two extremes lies the category where Texas law sometimes defines the genesis of life at the elusive point of viability. This is the point
where Texas abortion laws facially draw a line for protection of the fetus 95
which, in and of itself, creates inconsistency.
An inconsistency results due to the facial nature of this definition. On its
face, the abortion statute prohibits abortions after the point of viability. 96
Exceptions arise in situations where the mother's health is at risk, the fetus
would be born with an irreversible abnormality, or where the pregnancy is
not in the third trimester. 97 The statute defines "viable" as the point where
the doctor determines that the unborn child can live outside of the womb. 98
The definition goes on to limit itself to only those fetuses whose biparietal
diameter, or BPD, a measurement of the head, 99 is sixty millimeters or

five for disclaimer on behalf of unborn); Tx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010(cX2) (Vernon
Supp. 1991) (representation of unborn person to disclaim trust interest).
90. See Foshee v. Republic Natl Bank of Dallas, 617 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1981) (rule
against perpetuities includes period of gestation).
91. See Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (unborn child considered "in being");
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61, 67, 12 S.W. 838, 840 (1889) (fetus eight
months old at time of father's death participated in wrongful death recovery).
92. See, e.g., Bobo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 63 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988,
writ ref'd) (fetus not person under defense-of-third-party statute), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066
(1989); Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692 (murder statute only applies to a human being born alive);
Ogas v. State, 655 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ) (fetus is not within
Penal Code definition of "person").
93. See, e.g., WItty, 727 S.W.2d at 505 (no fetal cause of action until live birth); Yandell,
471 S.W.2d at 570 (where child born alive and survives, action for prenatal injuries exists);
Leal, 419 S.W.2d at 821 (allowing wrongful death recovery where child born alive later died).
But see Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (child en ventre sa mere at time of father's
death was "in being" under Wrongful Death Act).
94. See Aguilar v. Barker, 699 S.W.2d 915, 917 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no
writ) (care of child from point of birth is within Family Code's purpose).
95. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 4495b, § 4.011(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (absent
exception, viable third trimester fetus may not be intentionally or knowingly aborted); TEx.
REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976) (protecting child against destruction who
would otherwise be born alive). See generally Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 131, 141-44 (1979) (discussing problems with drawing
line of fetal protection at the point of viability).
96. See Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (prohibiting abortion of viable third trimester fetus).
97. See id. § 4.011 (d) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (listing exceptions to abortion prohibition).
98. See TEx. REV.CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (defining the term "viable").
99. The biparietal diameter is a frequently used measurement which represents "the
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more.'°° Thus, viability is limited to a point after the third trimester where
the BPD of the fetus is greater than or equal to six centimeters.1 0 1 However,
it is common for a normal child to be born with a BPD of less than sixty
millimeters.1 2 Furthermore, many premature infants born prior to the
third trimester of pregnancy develop into normal children.10 3 Thus, the
abortion statute, while facially purporting to protect potential life at the
point of viability, actually denies protection to many viable fetuses. This
runs counter to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Webster that a
in protection of potential life begins even prior to the point of
state's interest
14
viability.
It would also appear that the use of a biparietal measurement leads to
inaccurate and discriminatory results. Studies show that in obtaining the fetal BPD through the use of ultrasound technology, age determinations based
on multiple measurements of the same fetus made the same day may vary by
two to four weeks. 10 ' Also, scientific studies show that white fetuses generally have larger BPDs than non-whites."
Further, males have larger BPDs
greatest traverse diameter of the head." EASTMAN & HELLMAN, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 196
(13th ed. 1966).
100. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011(aX3) (Vernon Supp. 1991)
(statutory definition of viable).
101. Id.
102. See J.M. TANNER, FOETUS INTO MAN, PHYSICAL GROWTH FROM CONCEPTION

TO MATURITY 47-48 (1989) (tables showing fetus with biparietal diameter of sixty millimeters
to be twenty-three to twenty-seven weeks old); J. WILLKE & B. WILLKE, ABORTION QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 60-62 (1985) (listing instances of premature live births resulting in normal
child as early as twenty weeks gestation); Sabbagha, Barton & Barton, SonarBiparietalDiameter, .Analysis of PercentileGrowth Differences in Two Normal Populations Using Same Methodology, 126 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 479, 480 (1976) (showing fetus with
biparietal diameter of six centimeters to be of gestational age of approximately twenty-two to
twenty-five weeks); Sabbagha & Hughey, Standardization of Sonar Cephalometry and GestationalAge, 52 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 402, 403 (1978) (studies placing fetus with biparietal diameter of six centimeters at age of approximately twenty-four weeks).
103. See J. WILLKE & B. WILLKE, ABORTION QUESTIONS & ANswERS 60-62 (1985)
(showing cases of premature birth resulting in healthy normal child well within the second
trimester; one occurring at San Antonio's Brooke Army Hospital and another in Victoria,
Texas).
104. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (opinion by
Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and White, J.) (state's interest in protecting unborn accrues prior
to viability).
105. See Sabbagha & Hughey, Standardization of Sonar Cephalometry and Gestational
Age, 52 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 402, 403-04 (1978) (assessment of gestational age in
same fetus made on same day varied from two to four weeks); see also ASSESSMENT AND CARE
OF THE FETUS, PHYSIOLOGICAL, CLINICAL AND MEDICOLEGAL PRINCIPLES 526 (R. EDEN &

F. BOEHM eds. 1990) (biparietal diameter can be influenced by fetal position and amniotic fluid
volume).
106. See EASTMAN & HELLMAN, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 197 (13th ed. 1966) (showing
average fetal biparietal diameter of whites to be greater than non-whites).
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than females.107 Therefore, by basing viability on an infant's BPD, the
Texas abortion statute considers a white male fetus more viable than either a
female or non-white fetus. However, the statute cannot be said to violate
constitutional equal protection guarantees because the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to fetuses.10 8
IV.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In shaping fetal rights law, other jurisdictions are also faced with these
same tough questions. However, they often reach very different answers.
Comparison of other states' laws in major areas affecting the unborn further
illustrates the infirmity of certain Texas positions affecting fetal rights.
A.

Property Law

Texas follows the majority view which recognizes the right of a fetus to
inherit property." ° This view is held not simply by the majority, but universallyo and recognizes the rights of the fetus from conception. 1 1 Historical
roots in the common law and general policies of allowing people to dispose
of their 2property as they wish account for the uniformity in fetal inheritance
rights.

B.

11

CriminalLaw

In contrast, criminal law obtains the widest range of state views in the
protection of fetal rights.113 While some states protect fetal life through the
107. See id. (males' heads generally larger than females').
108. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (unborn child not person under Fourteenth Amendment).
109. See James v. James, 164 S.W. 47, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, writ
dism'd) (allowing unborn child to take under will).
110. See Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1987)
(describing fetal inheritance rule as "universal").
11. See James, 164 S.W. at 47 (child in mother's womb was in being and took under

will).
112. See Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 624-25, 14 S.W. 1021,
1022-23 (rex. 1890) (discussing common law basis of right of posthumous child to take under
will). See generally Rickhoff & Cukjati, Protectingthe Fetus From MaternalDrug andAlcohol
Abuse: A Proposalfor Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 276 (1989) (discussing historical development of fetal property rights).
113. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1985) (statute defining crime of feticide as knowing or intentional termination of human pregnancy with exceptions of statutory
abortion or intent to produce live birth) with Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex.
App.-E Paso 1985, writ ref'd) (Texas murder statute does not protect a child prior to live
birth). See generally Rickhoff & Cukjati, Protectingthe Fetus From MaternalDrug and Alcohol Abuse: A Proposalfor Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S LJ. 259, 282 (1989) (discussing irregular
growth of criminal law affecting fetal rights).
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use of special criminal statutes,1 14 others offer protection under general
states offer no protection for
homicide statutes.' 1 5 On the other hand, some
16
potential life under their criminal statutes.'
Some states protect the unborn through feticide statutes.' 17 Feticide statutes generally impose criminal sanctions for knowing or intentional destruction of the fetus through acts which would constitute murder if they had
resulted in the death of the mother." 18 These statutes protect fetal life beginning at conception or from the point of viability." 9 Other states simply
place the fetus under the protection of their homicide statutes.' 20 A major
generally
difference between these two approaches is that feticide statutes
2
impose lighter penalties than the general homicide statutes.' '
Texas falls within that group of states which offers the weakest protection
of the fetus under its criminal statutes. 1 22 Texas has no feticide statutes and
123
excludes unborn children from the protection of its homicide statutes.
Texas does have an abortion statute which imposes criminal sanctions for
114. See, eg., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988) (Georgia criminal feticide statute); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1985) (Indiana feticide statute); IOWA CODE § 707.7 (1979)
(Iowa feticide law); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-.8 (West Supp. 1991) (Louisiana feticide
statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (1978) (New Mexico criminal abortion law).
115. See, eg., Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1989) (causing death of fetus by knowing or reckless injury to mother proscribed under Arizona manslaughter statute); CAL. PENAL

CODE § 187 (Deering 1985) (California statute defining murder as "unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987) (including unborn
child of twenty-four weeks gestational age or more within New York statutory definition of
homicide); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990) (including unborn child within protections of
Utah criminal homicide law).
116. See Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692 (no fetal protection under Texas murder statute
until live birth); accord Hollis v. Commonwealth 652 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Ky. 1983) (live birth
required for conviction under Kentucky murder statute).
117. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Bums 1985);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-.8 (West Supp. 1991); see also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para.
9-1.2 (Supp. 1990) (Illinois "Intentional homicide of an unborn child" statute).
118. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Bums 1985) (knowing or intentional termination
of pregnancy other than for purposes of live birth or statutory abortion is felony).
119. See, ag., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988) (feticide is willful killing of child
"quick," or, alive in mother's womb); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Supp. 1990) (Illi-

nois statute protecting unborn child from fertilization to birth); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.554
(Callaghan 1990) (Michigan statute prohibiting "wilful killing of an unborn quick child").
120. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1985) (California murder statute including
fetus within its protections); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (Mass. 1984)
(fetus is "person" under Massachusetts vehicular homicide law).
121. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1985) (feticide is class C felony) with
id. (voluntary manslaughter is class A or class B felony).
122. See Showery, 690 S.W.2d at 692 (Texas homicide statute offers no protection until
child born alive).
123. Id.
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violators. 124 However, any potential protection offered by the statute is apparently negated by a lack of enforcement.12 5
C. Abortion Law
Due to the fact that Roe remains the "supreme law of the land," it has
dramatically affected state abortion legislation over the past several years.12 6
However, even after Roe, many states have made attempts to provide greater
protection to unborn children.12 7 In fact, Missouri's efforts to provide
greater fetal protections brought about the Webster decision. 128 Since Webster, some states have attempted to broaden fetal rights through legislative
restrictions on abortion.129 Even though Webster now allows states to protect potential life by restricting abortions from a point prior to viability,
Texas continues to deny fetal protection under its abortion law even after the
point of true viability. 13 0
D. Tort Law
Texas is anything but a trendsetter in the area of fetal tort remedies. In
fact, Texas was the second-to-the-last jurisdiction to allow a cause of action
for prenatal injuries. 3 ' Texas also remains in the small and decreasing miwhich disallow a wrongful death cause of action for an
nority of jurisdictions
132
fetus.
unborn
In 1987, in Witty v. American General CapitalDistributors,33 the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the issue of recovery for the wrongful death of an
124. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976).
125. See id. (no notes of decision interpreting statute).
126. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (opinion by
Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J., and White, J.) (modifying Roe in some respects but leaving it
undisturbed as to others).
127. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.015 (Supp. 1983) (amended in 1979 and 1986 adding
definition of conception and defining unborn child from point of conception).
128. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 499 (appeal to determine constitutionality of Missouri abortion laws).
129. See 1991 La. Sess. Law Serv. 26 (West) (new Louisiana statute stating that life begins at time of conception).
130. See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 4.011 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (allowing
abortion up to point of viability but limiting viability by statutory definition based on gestational age and fetal head size).
131. See Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 822 & n.3 (Tex. 1967)
(at time Texas granted action for prenatal injuries only Alabama had not allowed such an
action).
132. See Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Tex. 1987)
(Kilgarlin, J., dissenting) (at time of case thirty-six jurisdictions allowed fetal wrongful death
action while eight did not).
133. 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
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unborn child for the first time. 3 4 The Court denied any wrongful death
recovery based on the language of the wrongful death statute which disallows any cause of action for wrongful death where no cause of action exists
for injuries.13 ' At the time Witty was written, the District of Columbia and
thirty-five states allowed a wrongful death recovery for a viable unborn fedid not allow such recovery and
tus. 1 36 Of the remaining states, only eight
137
the rest had not considered the issue.
Since Witty, Colorado, which had not considered the issue, now allows a
fetal wrongful death action, and Maine, which had also not addressed the
issue, does not allow recovery.13 1 This leaves a minority of nine states which
do not allow such an action while a thirty-seven jurisdiction majority allows
recovery.139 By reversing well-reasoned court of appeals decisions,"4 the
Texas Supreme Court has consistently refused to join the modern trend toward allowing fetal wrongful death recovery. This means that Texas "will
again merit the dubious distinction of being one of the last states, if ever, to
accept... a wrongful death action for the death of a fetus at the hands of a
negligent tortfeasor."' 41
V.

A PROPOSAL

FOR REFORM

The recognition of fetal rights in Texas has been plagued by inconsistent
answers to tough questions put before its courts. 42 This problem is further
compounded by legislative and judicial tardiness in recognizing the majority
trend toward preservation of fetal rights. 43 The result is a system of protection for the rights of unborn children which cries out for reform. By recog134. See id. at 504 (Witty sued under Wrongful Death Act for damages resulting from
death of her fetus).
135. See id. at 505 (under statute no cause of action exists for death where no cause of

action exists for injuries).
136. Id. at 512 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
137. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 512 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
138. See Espadero v.Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Colo. 1986) (allowing wrongful
death recovery for viable fetus under Colorado wrongful death statute); Milton v. Cary Medical Center, 538 A.2d 252, 256 (Me. 1988) (disallowing fetal wrongful death action).
139. See Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 512 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting) (eight jurisdictions denying
fetal wrongful death action at time of case); Milton, 538 A.2d at 256 (Maine now disallows
wrongful death action for unborn child).
140. See Blackman v. Langford 795 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1990) (reversing lower court's
decision which allowed fetal wrongful death recovery); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Lobdell,
726 S.W.2d 23, 23 (rex. 1987) (reversing appellate court's decision to allow wrongful death

recovery for fetus).
141. Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 507 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).

142. Compare Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., 727 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.
1987) (no cause of action for injury resulting in fetal death) with Yandell v. Delgado, 471
S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971) (cause of action exists for prenatal injury where fetus survives).
143. See Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. 1967) (Texas
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nizing fetal rights in some situations while refusing to recognize them in
others, Texas continues to maintain positions on fetal rights which are
irreconcilable. 1"
Steps which will bring about both consistency among Texas laws and
bring Texas in line with the current majority view need to be taken.145 One
such step is the recognition of the unborn child as a person under the
Wrongful Death Act. Inconsistent recognition of the fetus as both a person
and nonperson under this statute signifies the need for change. 1" This could
easily be brought about by either judicial14 7 or legislative action.148
The judiciary has said that the job of changing the Wrongful Death Act is
one for the legislature.14 9 However, a change to the statute is not necessary.
The judiciary could interpret the statute to allow recovery for a fetal death in
accord with precedent which allows the unborn child to recover for a parental death under the Wrongful Death Act. 150 This would not violate any
legislative function in light of the fact that entire causes of action have been
judicially created in the past.15 1
Similarly, protection of the fetus under criminal statutes is ripe territory
for either judicial or legislative action. Currently Texas courts interpret
was second-to-last state to allow action for fetal injuries); Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 512 (Kilgarlin,
J., dissenting) (Texas remains in minority by rejecting fetal wrongful death action).
144. Compare Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tex. 1990) (recent Texas
case disallowing recovery for fetus under Wrongful Death Act) with Nelson v. Galveston, H. &
S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 621, 626, 14 S.W. 1021, 1023 (1890) (unborn child can recover for
father's demise under Wrongful Death Act).
145. See Witty, 729 S.W.2d at 507 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over
Texas' tardiness in following the majority).
146. Compare Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 504 (fetus is not "person" under Wrongful Death
Act) with Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (unborn child is "in being" under Wrongful
Death Act). See generally Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere, 12 ST. Louis L. REv.
85, 85-86 (1927) (discussing goal of consistency in the law and the inconsistent state of laws
affecting fetal rights).
147. See TEx. CONST. art. II, § 1 (setting up judicial branch of government); TEx.
CONST. art. V, § 1 (granting judicial power to the courts); Texas v. Smith, 434 S.W.2d 342, 350
(Tex. 1968)(Smith, J., dissenting) (chief judicial function is interpretation).
148. See TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 (setting up legislative branch of government); TEX.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (giving state legislative power to House of Representatives and Senate);
City of Weatherford v. Parker County, 794 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1990) (legislature has plenary
power to pass laws).
149. See Blackman, 795 S.W.2d at 743 (no cause of action for wrongful death of fetus
until legislature says so).
150. See Smith, 434 S.W.2d at 350 (Smith, J., dissenting) (judiciary has power to interpret statutes); Nelson, 78 Tex. at 626, 14 S.W. at 1023 (recognizing existence of fetus under
Wrongful Death Act).
151. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984) (recognizing prior case judicially creating "wrongful birth" cause of action).
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criminal statutes as not including a fetus as a "person." 15' 2 This exclusion is
based on the Penal Code's statutory definition of "person" ' 3 which includes
"an individual, corporation, or association." ' 4 The statutory definition of
"individual" includes only those born and alive.155 Therefore, under the judicial interpretation of these definitions, a corporation may be protected by
the use of deadly force, while an unborn child may not.15 6 Contrarily, the
legislature has clearly expressed its intent to protect the unborn through
criminal sanctions of imprisonment.157 Yet this intention remains unenforced. 15 Texas courts could simply rely on this manifestation of intent to
protect unborn children when interpreting criminal statutes instead of focusing on the semantics of codified definitions. This would bring Texas in line
with the majority of jurisdictions protecting the unborn through criminal
sanctions.159

152. See Ogas v. State, 655 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983, no writ) (fetus
not included in statutory definition of "person").
153. See id. (interpreting defense-of-third-person statutes by statutory definition of
"person").
154. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(27) (Vernon 1974).
155. Id. § 1.07(17) (Vernon 1974).
156. Compare Ogas, 655 S.W.2d at 325 (fetus not protected by defense-of-third-party
statute because not included in statutory definition of "person") with TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 1.07(27) (Vernon 1974) (placing corporation within statutory definition of "person").
157. See TEX. Rlv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.5 (Vernon 1976) (destroying unborn viable child results in penalty of five years to life).
158. See id. (no cases interpreting statute).
159. See, eg., Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1989) (in Arizona manslaughter includes causing fetal death knowingly or recklessly); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1985)
(killing fetus with malice aforethought is murder in California); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09
(West 1976) (Florida law prohibiting killing unborn child); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988)
(Georgia feticide statute); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Supp. 1991) (Illinois law
prohibiting "Intentional homicide of an unborn child"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns
1985) (Indiana feticide statute); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-.8 (West Supp. 1991) (Louisiana feticide law); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.554 (Callaghan 1990) (Michigan criminal law
prohibiting killing of "quick" fetus); MINN. STAT. § 609.2661 (1987) (Minnesota murder of
unborn child statute); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1972) (Mississippi homicide statute applying to unborn "quick" children); NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.210 (1989) (Nevada law setting up
penalty for willful killing of unborn "quick" child); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (1984) (New
Mexico criminal abortion statute); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987) (homicide
law applies to twenty-four week or older fetus); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,

§ 713

(West 1983)

(Oklahoma homicide law prohibiting willful killing of "quick" fetus); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-17-6 (1988) (South Dakota law setting up penalty for intentional killing of fetus);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (Supp. 1990) (Tennessee including viable fetus within protection of criminal homicide laws); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990) (homicide law protects
unborn fetus); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (1988) (Virginia criminal abortion law); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (1988) (Washington law defining intentional killing of unborn
"quick" child as first degree manslaughter); see also, eg., Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536
N.E.2d 571, 576 (Mass. 1989) (viable unborn child is protected by murder law); Goodman v.
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COMMENTS

Finally, the Texas legislature should reform its abortion laws to bring
Texas up to date in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Webster.16°
Even the old Roe standard would allow the Texas abortion standard to be
moved up to the point of true viability. 61 Furthermore, Texas law could be
updated to reflect the current constitutional standard
under Webster which
1 62
viability.
to
prior
life
potential
of
protection
allows
VI.

CONCLUSION

Inconsistent recognition of the rights of the unborn in Texas has resulted
in nothing short of a melee of statutes and statutory interpretations. The
courts place the burden of change on the shoulders of the legislature while
the legislature appears to still be reeling from the blow dealt to it in 1973 by
the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade. This leaves parents who have suffered the loss of their unborn child without remedy or
recourse against those responsible for the loss of their child. A woman who
has borne a child for eight-and-a-half months with all the attendant discomfort and pain of pregnancy is refused compensation and told that she has lost
nothing when the fetus within her is destroyed. Interestingly, this message
comes from nine men who are utterly incapable of ever experiencing what
she has been through.
This problem is compounded by the fact that parents in many other states
faced with the same loss have a remedy. They may be able to recover monetarily from a negligent tortfeasor. They may also see justice done for a criminal act perpetrated against their unborn child. Yet in Texas, relief in either
form is unavailable unless their child survives the acts of the tortfeasor or
criminal.
Changes in Texas' laws affecting fetal rights could bring forth rewards of
consistency and predictability which are currently lacking in this area. Furthermore, they could be brought about without any danger whatsoever of
violating modern constitutional standards. These changes would also bring
Texas in line with modern legal trends which provide stronger protections
for the unborn. Therefore, it would be in the best interest of the citizens of
Texas, both present and future, for our lawmakers to work toward such
reforms.

State, 601 P.2d 178, 185 (Wyo. 1979) (Wyoming case allowing prosecution for killing of un-

born child).
160. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989) (state's interest in protecting unborn accrues prior to point of viability).
161. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (state's interest in potential life becomes
compelling at point of viability).
162. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 519 (finding state's interest in protecting unborn begins
before viability).
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